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FILLING POWER VACUUMS IN THE NEW 
GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 
Anne-Marie Slaughter* 
Abstract: In her Keynote Address at the October, 12, 2012 Symposium, 
Filling Power Vacuums in the New Global Legal Order, Anne-Marie Slaughter 
describes the concepts of “power over” and “power with” in the global 
world of law. Power over is the ability to achieve the outcomes you want by 
commanding or manipulating others. Power with is the ability to mobilize 
people to do things. In the globalized world, power operates much more 
through power with than through power over. In contrast to the hierar-
chical power of national governments, globally it is more important to be 
central in the horizontal system of multiple sovereigns. This Address illus-
trates different examples of power over and power with. It concludes that 
in this globalized world, lawyers are ideally trained and positioned to ex-
ercise power. 
Introduction 
 I love the title of this Symposium because I’ve been thinking a lot 
about power in a number of different contexts. This Symposium gives 
me the chance to apply some of that thinking, at least in a preliminary 
way, to thinking about the globalization of law. I’ve obviously been out 
of the pure legal world for a long time, but in government, I sat across 
the table from Harold Koh, the legal advisor of the Department of 
State, at Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s meeting every morning. Of 
course, Harold and I had sat on many panels together, and our careers 
have been intertwined, but I got a chance to see firsthand the way law 
shapes politics and constrains power. I was very pleased, then, to start 
thinking about how law operates in a vacuum, or in the relatively open 
spaces of a globalized world. 
 Let me start with a couple of reflections on power, and the nature 
of power.1 Then, I will talk about how I think those conceptions of 
 
* © 2013, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Bert G. Kerstetter ’66 University Professor of Politics 
and International Affairs, Princeton University. From 2009–2011, she served as Director of 
Policy Planning for the United States Department of State. This Article is an adaptation of 
Professor Slaughter’s Keynote Address at Boston College Law School’s Symposium, Filling 
Power Vacuums in the New Global Legal Order, on October 12, 2012. 
1 See infra notes 4–23 and accompanying text. 
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power apply to law.2 I will end by talking a little bit about how that ap-
plies to lawyering.3 
I. Power as Ladders and Webs: Power Over and Power With 
 I think a lot about power in terms of the vertical and horizontal 
worlds, to start with the most abstract ideas. One way to think about this 
concretely is the ladder and the web.4 If you think about power in 
terms of a ladder, you want to be at the top. It’s a vertical ascent. If you 
think about power in terms of a web, you want to be at the center. 
There is no top. Power in a web comes from the center, outward. To be 
at the top of a ladder would be to be on the periphery of a web. To be 
at the center of a web would be to be midpoint on the ladder. 
                                                                                                                     
 This is a very different way of thinking about power. The examples 
come from Professor Carol Gilligan’s book from the early 1980s, In a 
Different Voice.5 She actually wrote the book about how adolescent boys 
and girls think about relationships in terms of ladders and webs. I’m 
not sure whether the gender dimension makes a difference. For my 
purposes, they are two equally valid ways of thinking about power and 
both, certainly, operate in the world today. 
 The next way to think about ladders and webs is to think of the 
ladder as “power over.” If you’re at the top of a ladder, you have power 
over the people below you. You can tell them what to do. It’s a hierar-
chy. If you have power in a web—if you’re at the center of a web—you 
don’t have power over anyone. It’s horizontal. You can’t make anyone 
do anything, but you have “power with” them. It’s the distinction be-
tween power over and power with. If you’re at the center of a web, you 
can mobilize people to do all sorts of things. You have all the connec-
tions you need to bring people together to make things happen. But it 
is a different kind of power, and you have to exercise it differently.6 I 
first heard this distinction from Professor Lani Guinier, my former col-
league at Harvard. I’ve read it in many different places, but I remember 
 
2 See infra notes 24–60 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text. 
4 See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s 
Development 32 (35th prtg. 1998) (contrasting boys’ “hierarchical ordering” with girls’ 
“web of relationships” as ways of thinking about conflict and choice). 
5 Id. 
6 See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Miner’s Canary: Enlisting Race, Re-
sisting Power, Transforming Democracy 108–30, 141–47 (2002). 
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her talking about the distinction of power over versus power with fif-
teen years ago.7 
 For our purposes today, I want to suggest that these are two ways to 
think about power in the national state and power in the global econ-
omy: power over and power with, or ladders and webs. In the national 
state, it’s much more of a hierarchy, at least formally. We have the fed-
eral government, we have state governments. We think about law and 
politics in hierarchical terms. Now, within the federal government, we 
have checks and balances, such that we have no one institution that 
controls all the others, but broadly, it’s a hierarchy. In the global econ-
omy, it is much more of a web. There are certainly elements of hierar-
chy such as the United Nations system or other sources of international 
law.8 By and large, however, when you think about power in diplomacy, 
or power in any area that is not very strictly regulated, you’re talking 
about a horizontal system of multiple sovereigns in which it’s very im-
portant to be central.9 Indeed, I have argued that the power of the 
United States comes from our central position in that global web.10 But, 
it’s easier to think about power exercised horizontally, rather than ver-
tically. We can think about that very broadly: vertical power/horizontal 
power, ladder/web, national/global. 
A. Power Over 
 Now, let me turn to more specific definitions of power in each 
context. With respect to vertical power, I would define it as getting the 
outcomes you want. Professor Joseph Nye, who has written a great deal 
                                                                                                                      
7 As an example of web versus hierarchy, compare President Barack Obama’s primary 
election campaign in 2008 with Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Secretary Clinton had a cen-
tralized campaign that was top down, and people continually had to get instructions from 
the top. President Obama had “My Obama.” He sent people into different places across 
the country and basically said, “You tell me what is going to work here and you customize 
it.” The result was electric: you could see this web spreading as different people joined and 
different people contributed. He captured this energy and creativity and momentum, and 
that was really powerful. 
8 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1 (establishing the authority of the International 
Court of Justice over United Nations Members); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (establishing the World Trade 
Organization). 
9 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, America’s Edge: Power in the Networked Century, 88 
Foreign Aff. 94 (2009) (arguing that, for numerous reasons, the United States has the 
potential to be the most connected country in a networked world). 
10 See id. at 95–96. 
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on power—indeed, his last five books have had “power” in the title11— 
defines power as “the capacity to do things and in social situations to 
affect others to get the outcomes we want.”12 In other words, power is 
either the ability to do things yourself, without anybody constraining 
you, or the ability to get other people to do what you want.13 
 Nye talks about three ways in which that power operates.14 The 
first is command.15 You can command change. You can simply tell peo-
ple they have to do what you want. As the mother of teenagers, the lim-
its of that power are readily apparent. You can command, but they will 
not necessarily obey.16 Indeed, you more often get a counter-reaction. 
But yes, there are certainly situations in which the first way we think 
about power is command. 
                                                                                                                     
 The second way—and this is still drawing on Nye’s work—is con-
trolling agendas.17 We’re familiar with this, too. If you have ever worked 
in a bureaucracy or chaired a meeting, you have three options. One is 
extreme in one direction, the other is extreme in the other direction, 
and the one in the middle looks just right. So there, you’re really using 
ideas and institutions to frame agendas for action in ways that make 
some options seem out of bounds. You drive people toward your pre-
ferred option. Just to continue the parenting metaphor, this would be 
like saying, “Would you like to go to theater camp or art camp or sports 
camp?” There are a whole bunch of things that are really not on the 
table. So, we’re shaping agendas. 
 
11 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (2011) [hereinafter Nye, The Future 
of Power]; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s 
Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (2002); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power in the Global 
Information Age (2004); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Powers to Lead (2008); Joseph S. 
Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004) [hereinafter 
Nye, Soft Power]. 
12 Nye, The Future of Power, supra note 11, at 6; see Nye, Soft Power, supra note 
11, at 1–2; Richard L. Armitage & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Introduction to CSIS Commission on 
Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America 5, 6–7 (2007), available at http://csis. 
org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf (“Power is the ability to in- 
fluence the behavior of others to get a desired outcome.”). 
13 See Nye, The Future of Power, supra note 11, at 6. 
14 See Nye, Soft Power, supra note 11, at 6–7. 
15 See id. at 6. 
16 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power, Foreign Pol’y, Autumn 1990, at 153, 166 (stating 
that parents have greater and more enduring power if they shape their children’s beliefs 
and preferences than if they rely on active control). 
17 See Nye, Soft Power, supra note 11, at 7 (“You can restrict my preferences by setting 
the agenda in such a way that my more extravagant wishes seem too unrealistic to pursue.”). 
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 The third way—and again, this is power over, thinking about it ver-
tically—is to shape preferences.18 This is Gramscian hegemony.19 This 
is the way in which you shape what people want without them ever be-
ing aware of it. It is the norms, the deep beliefs, the ideas, the culture, 
so that we want things, or we believe things to be true, without ever 
recognizing the power of the culture. Obviously, Madison Avenue’s in-
fluence is based on this kind of power: with advertising, we are con-
stantly subject to these kinds of forces.20 You recognize this all the time. 
You say things like, “We don’t do that. That is not something we do.” 
Every family has its own sense of “our” values. Or, in a school, you have 
deep values. That’s what structures the community; that is the power of 
shaping preferences. That’s power over: command, controlling agen-
das, and shaping preferences. 
B. Power With 
 Now, let’s think about the contrast with power with, and what pow-
er looks like in a setting where you do not have direct control over eve-
rybody. Command is off the table because you’re one person in a group 
of equals. Anybody who’s tried to lead a faculty of tenured professors 
will be very sympathetic to this view. You don’t have actual control. 
 Therefore, instead of command, the first option under power with 
is to convene, to connect, and to catalyze. You can’t make people do 
anything, but again, if you’re at the center of that web, you can bring 
people together. You can connect them in ways that you actually can 
control. You can say, “You should meet so-and-so,” and you know the 
two of them have a project or an interest in common. You know that 
they’re aligned. Suddenly, you have sparked something that you want to 
happen, but you’re doing it through those whom you connect. Then, 
                                                                                                                      
18 See id. (“[Y]ou can appeal to my sense of attraction, love, or duty in our relationship 
and appeal to our shared values about the justness of contributing to those shared values 
and purposes.”). 
19 See generally Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of An-
tonio Gramsci (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971). Although 
Antonio Gramsci never fully elaborated his theory of cultural hegemony, the posthu-
mously printed essays that he penned in prison became a significant contribution to twen-
tieth-century Marxist thought. See, e.g., Thomas R. Bates, Gramsci and the Theory of Hegem-
ony, 36 J. Hist. Ideas 351, 351 (1975); Douglas Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law, 
2000 BYU L. Rev. 515, 515, 518. Gramscian hegemony holds that power is achieved not 
only by force, but also by ideas. See Bates, supra, at 351. 
20 See generally Tamara R. Piety, “Merchants of Discontent”: An Exploration of the Psychology 
of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 Seattle U. L. Rev. 377 
(2001) (comparing the effects of Madison Avenue advertising campaigns to the psychology 
of addiction). 
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of course, you catalyze action. Imagine if we were all in a social move-
ment, and I had brought you all here and I had connected you. You’re 
all passionate about human rights or you’re all passionate about the 
environment. Then, I catalyze action by proposing that we do some-
thing together. It’s the person who can bring all those people together 
and can mobilize them that holds the power. Even the word “power” 
doesn’t quite work in the same way it does vertically. Instead of com-
mand, you convene, you connect, you catalyze. 
 Second, instead of controlling an agenda where I bring you all to-
gether and I give you a carefully constrained set of choices, I actually do 
the opposite. In power with, you don’t constrain, you open up. I 
brought you together, having chosen who’s here, and we’re all together 
with a common purpose. If I tell you, “Here are our three options,” 
many of you will leave. You will not want to accept my options. If I want 
to mobilize you, I actually put some general ideas on the table, and 
then I open myself up to your ideas. I get people mobilized if they 
think they can actually contribute and I will hear them.21 Another way 
to put this is, if I want to persuade you of something, you have to be 
certain you can persuade me. You have to be certain I’m hearing you, 
that I’m not just standing up here with a predetermined agenda that 
I’m going to have you adopt, and pretend that we reached it together. 
You actually have to be able to contribute. 
 So, it’s actually the opposite of controlling an agenda. You are say-
ing, “I’m going to listen to you, and I’m going to change my sense of 
exactly what I thought I wanted when I came in here, depending on 
what you say.” There has to be a broad set of constraints. If we come 
together for an environmental movement, we’re not going to walk out 
of here pursuing digital technology. Within that broad area, however, 
you open yourself up. Instead of constraining, you create as many ways 
for people to participate as possible. 
 Third, instead of shaping preferences—that deep structure where 
you, in various ways, adopt a culture and have that shape what people 
want—many people in the power with world talk about the power of 
sharing. Instead of constraining or shaping preferences, what you’re 
actually doing is sharing what you have and inviting others to share 
back. It sounds very touchy-feely, but it has some very concrete applica-
tions, which I will get to.22 In the Internet world, as just one example, if 
                                                                                                                      
21 See Daniel Goleman, Leadership That Gets Results, 78 Harv. Bus. Rev. 78, 78, 85–86 
(2000) (contrasting the benefits of a leadership style that welcomed input with the draw-
backs of leading by fiat). 
22 See infra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
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you want to gather followers on Twitter, you put stuff out, people send 
stuff to you, and you share back.23 It’s an active culture of generosity 
that brings people together and then they shape their preferences and 
their action. That’s all very abstract, so let me now turn to how I think 
those different kinds of power operate in the world of law, and, specifi-
cally, in the global world of law. 
II. Power Over and Power With in the Global World of Law 
A. Power Over 
 The power over is quite easy. This is where we start with the power 
of law. First, there is command—we know all about that. That is, of 
course, what you learn when you come to law school. You think, ini-
tially, law is all about command. You think it’s all about actual enforce-
ment. Most people, when you talk about the power of law, say law can 
only operate where you have the ability to enforce.24 You need your 
federal marshals. You need to be able to lock people up if they violate 
the law. That is true, at the core. Of course, we know law actually exer-
cises power in many broader ways than that.25 But, command is easy. 
You have a law, you violate it, you enforce it. 
 Second, of course, is controlling agendas. There again, that’s what 
law does. It constrains options. It says some things are simply out of 
bounds. Think about the way our Constitution shapes First Amend-
ment law, for example. If you want to fight hate crime, for instance, you 
cannot proscribe speech. The First Amendment limits you to a narrow 
set of options. Law does that all the time. Indeed, when you think about 
choosing a policy and enacting it in law, what you are doing is creating 
spaces within which people can actually act. 
                                                                                                                      
23 See Strategies for Effective Tweeting: A Statistical Review, Buddy Media, http://marketing 
cloud.buddymedia.com/whitepaper-form_strategies-for-effective-tweeting (last visited Apr. 9, 
2013) (login required) (analyzing the effectiveness of Twitter techniques of major brands); 
Twitter for Small Business, Twitter, https://business.twitter.com/pdfs/Twitter_Smallbiz_ 
Guide.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2013) (encouraging users to engage their audiences through 
various strategies). 
24 See Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really ‘Law’?, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1293, 1293 
(1984). 
25 See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security, 
52 B.C. L. Rev. 1147, 1163 (2011) (describing the advantages of law that is not binding); 
Joshua Kleinfeld, Enforcement and the Concept of Law, 121 Yale L.J. Online 293, 306–15 (2011), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1029.pdf (arguing that enforcement power is 
not a necessary condition for law). 
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 Third is shaping preferences. That is what a constitution does. A 
constitution constitutes a polity and it constitutes it according to certain 
values that are then enshrined in law. Americans react like they’re al-
lergic to a constraint on free speech. Even with respect to the British, if 
you look at the British libel laws, we regard them immediately as, 
“You’re really constraining free speech. How could you possibly do 
that?”26 That is deep shaping of preferences and it doesn’t require a lot 
more explanation than that. That is how national law operates. There is 
nothing particularly unusual about thinking about how power over 
translates into law. 
B. Power With 
 Let’s look at how law works in terms of power with. Here, we really 
are in a different world, and we see lots of examples. I want to try to 
present a framework to analyze those examples. Let’s assume we are 
thinking about nations, or we’re thinking about nongovernmental or-
ganizations (“NGOs”), or we’re thinking about corporations, or we’re 
thinking about universities. We are thinking of any of the actors on the 
global stage. They can be government and they can be nongovern-
ment, but we are in this horizontal world. We need to connect with 
others. We want to get things done. That’s the starting point. You can 
be a diplomat, an NGO strategist, or whoever. 
 Let’s take one example. We all fly; let’s be a member of the Star Al-
liance in the airline industry.27 It’s actually interesting: it is the only alli-
ance that has been created in my lifetime as an international relations 
professor.28 We have the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
we have all these old alliances, but the only new alliance I have seen is 
the Star Alliance and its equivalents.29 That’s important because those 
                                                                                                                      
26 Defamation Act, 1996, c. 31, §§ 1–20 (Eng.). Unlike most jurisdictions, the United 
Kingdom places the burden of proof in libel cases on the defendant, thereby making it 
more difficult to defend a libel action. See Eric Pfanner, Britain to Seek Curbs to ‘Libel Tour-
ism,’ N.Y. Times (May 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/business/media/ 
britain-to-seek-curbs-to-libel-tourism.html (describing plaintiffs’ attraction to British courts 
for libel actions). 
27 The Star Alliance is a network of twenty-seven airlines. Travel the World with the Star 
Alliance Network, Star Alliance, http://www.staralliance.com/en/about/member_airlines 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
28 Five airlines united their flight networks in 1997 to form the Star Alliance. See Star Alli-
ance Services GmbH, Star Alliance, http://www.staralliance.com/en/about/organisation/ 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
29 NATO was formed in 1949. See What Is NATO?: An Introduction to the Transatlantic Alli-
ance, N. Atlantic Treaty Org., http://www.nato.int/welcome/brochure_WhatIsNATO_ 
en.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
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are businesses that do not control each other.30 Those are national air-
lines. They have no power over each other. But it’s a powerful group. 
They come together, they give us frequent flier miles, we fly with them. 
That’s convening, connecting, and catalyzing. 
 If you think about power with, and you think about convening, 
connecting, and catalyzing, what does that mean for law? How does law 
help you convene, connect, and catalyze? In the first place, it’s the law 
that makes space that allows actors to act. It’s the law that creates spaces 
within which you can come together. 
 The best example is Internet governance. Think about the revolu-
tions in the Middle East. Think about how they have used the Internet 
in multiple ways. Now, they use it to upload videos so that we can all see 
what’s actually going on.31 But well before that, they used the Internet 
to communicate with each other.32 The revolutionaries who helped 
overturn Slobodan Milošević in Serbia actually came together with oth-
er groups around the world, including in the Middle East.33 They 
found each other online. They connected. 
 Then, of course, there are the actual revolutions: the ability of Fa-
cebook and Twitter to stay one step ahead of the state.34 Again, I don’t 
think social media created these revolutions. But, if you talk to the 
people who are a part of them, they will say speed was essential.35 Be-
cause before, by the time you’d organized a factory or a university or 
                                                                                                                      
30 See Xing Hu et al., Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances, Mgmt. Sci. (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/early/2012/11/28/mnsc.1120.1591.full.pdf 
(describing the independent character of airlines in alliances). 
31 See Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People Is Greater Than 
the People in Power: A Memoir 66, 86–87, 127, 188 (2012). 
32 See David Matas, Countering Hate on the Internet: Recommendations for Action, in The 
Holocaust’s Ghost: Writings on Art, Politics, Law, and Education 483, 483–84 
(F.C. Decoste & Bernard Schwartz eds., 2000) (describing how Serbian radio station Radio 
B92 broadcast information about protests in 1996 over the Internet after the government 
jammed the station’s signal). 
33 See id. 
34 See generally Ghonim, supra note 31 (recounting the role of Facebook in the demon-
strations in Tahrir Square, in Cairo, Egypt in 2011). But see Malcolm Gladwell, Does Egypt 
Need Twitter?, New Yorker News Desk (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/online/ 
blogs/newsdesk/2011/02/does-egypt-need-twitter.html (“People protested and brought 
down governments before Facebook was invented.”). 
35 See Ghonim, supra note 31, at 232 (“The rapid pace of events drove home one of the 
key strategies I learned from the revolution: to achieve your vision, you need friends and 
communication channels more than you need plans. The world moves too fast for even 
the best-laid plans to hold up.”). 
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any site against the State, the State was there.36 It could crack down on 
you before you could gain momentum. With Facebook and Twitter, 
however, you had a rolling speed of change that really worked. 
 That all relies on what, domestically, we think of as freedom of 
speech, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly. Online, that’s 
the law, and it is law we are all going to be a part of shaping.37 Does it 
allow that horizontal convening, connecting, and mobilizing? Do we 
have law that creates those spaces across borders the way we have it 
domestically? 
 It’s also the law that mandates group interaction. This is trickier. 
Obviously, because of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, 
you’re allowed to connect and to convene and to work together, but 
you don’t have to. What is the kind of law that forces you to actually 
work together? Think about the power of those young people together 
on Facebook, then together in the streets.38 Think about what that ac-
complishes. 
 But what brings people together? Some of this is the ability to op-
erate through social media, to connect with others. But there are much 
more specific ways in which law actually forces people together. For ex-
ample, shifting ground pretty radically, think about administrative law. 
Think about reason-giving requirements where you are required, as a 
government entity—or as a private entity—to give reasons for your de-
cisions.39 That forces you to come together with others and give rea-
sons. 
                                                                                                                      
36 See Emilia Luna, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia: Twitter Revolutions?, Tufts Daily (Mar. 11, 2011, 
7:03), http://www.tuftsdaily.com/news/egypt-libya-tunisia-twitter-revolutions-1.2511337#.UW 
IJMDfnZ1E. 
37 See generally Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2011) (arguing 
that companies like Google have an obligation to enable free speech on the Internet even 
when governments repress it). 
38 See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text. 
39 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). The section of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act on rule making requires: 
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons 
an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of writ-
ten data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presenta-
tion. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall 
incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis 
and purpose. 
Id.; see Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and 
Reasons, 61 Duke L.J. 1811, 1871 (2012) (“In social theory, reason giving is a practice asso-
ciated with negotiating social relationships and facilitating cooperation and collective ac-
tion.”). 
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 If you give reasons and you have a notice and comment require-
ment, people are enabled to comment on what you said, but they are 
not required to. Suppose you said, “Here’s our administrative regula-
tion. Here are our reasons for our administrative regulation. Here’s the 
notice we have to give.” Other people respond, “This is our reaction.” 
You have just structured a conversation. It requires people to come to-
gether and do that. Indeed, our entire lobbying industry, which we can 
pillory in many ways, is the way interests come together and actually 
define those interests, be they public interest groups or private. They 
come together and actually then work together to achieve an outcome. 
 Then, there’s the law that allows and encourages network creation. 
To the extent laws facilitate things like the Star Alliance, or loose rela-
tionships among corporations, among NGOs, among universities, across 
borders, that is the law operating through power with. This includes 
everything from liability rules to corporate governance rules, where 
you’re really allowing people to engage in these horizontal structures. 
 The second form of power with is where you open up and create 
opportunities to plug in. One way to think about this, for those of you 
who are familiar with the digital world, is through the open source 
movement: Linux versus Microsoft, essentially.40 How does open source 
work? The first thing it does is create as many opportunities as possible 
for people to plug in because the point of open source is to get as many 
people as possible engaged. 
 Another example would be something like InnoCentive.41 Procter 
& Gamble does over fifty percent of its research and development not 
in-house.42 Rather, they do it online. They do it by putting their prob-
lems out there on InnoCentive and then paying whichever inventor can 
actually come up with options.43 It’s crowdsourcing, but it’s crowdsourc-
ing in research and development. To do that, you actually want to create 
                                                                                                                      
40 Open source software means that the underlying computer code is made freely avail-
able. See Marcus Maher, Open Source Software: The Success of an Alternative Intellectual Property 
Incentive Paradigm, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 619, 619–46 (2000) (de-
scribing the open source development process). 
41 InnoCentive, https://www.innocentive.com/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2013) (providing 
information on InnoCentive, a web-based crowdsourcing and innovation platform); see 
Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 951, 966–67 (2011) (describ-
ing InnoCentive and other forms of crowdsourcing). 
42 Bruce Brown & Scott D. Anthony, How P&G Tripled Its Innovation Success Rate, 89 
Harv. Bus. Rev. 64, 72 (2011). 
43 See What We Do, InnoCentive, https://www.innocentive.com/about-innocentive (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
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opportunities for as many people to plug into what you’re doing as pos-
sible. You want to make it as open as possible, as accessible as possible. 
 The implications for transnational law are that instead of creating 
closed institutions, you want to create open networks, and you want to 
create them in ways that allow as many different parties to participate as 
possible. This gives you a different view of the proliferation of multilat-
eral institutions. If you look at Southeast Asia or Europe, there has 
been this huge proliferation.44 
 If you think about that vertically, it just looks incredibly confused. 
Where are the lines of authority? Who’s enforcing what? There are too 
many different institutions. If you look at it horizontally, and you think, 
“What we’re really trying to do is get as many nations and non-state ac-
tors as possible involved in a common project,” then more can actually 
be better. Not infinitely, but you take whatever institution you need to 
create to get whatever group of countries involved. 
 For a concrete example, think about Southeast Asia. You have so 
many different institutions. You have networks of all different regula-
tors. You have something like APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Coop-
eration,45 which is very big and very unwieldy. It involves all Latin 
American countries and South Pacific countries and North Pacific 
countries. Basically, it includes all the countries on the Pacific Rim, and 
also includes Taiwan and Hong Kong.46 It’s the only organization that 
can include Taiwan and Hong Kong because the Chinese will not allow 
Taiwan and Hong Kong to be included in a security organization as 
separate states.47 
 You then have a security organization, the East Asia Summit,48 
which has some subset of those institutions but does not include Taiwan 
or Hong Kong. Still, you can actually discuss security. From a vertical, 
who-controls-what perspective, that looks really messy, but from the 
idea that you want to create institutions that can get as many different 
actors as possible around the table, that actually looks much better. 
                                                                                                                      
44 See Kai He, Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic Interde-
pendence and China’s Rise 147 (2009). 
45 APEC comprises twenty-one members. Member Economies, Asia-Pac. Econ. Coopera-
tion, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2013). 
46 See id. 
47 Sigrid Winkler, Taiwan’s UN Dilemma: To Be or Not to Be, Taiwan-U.S. Quarterly Analysis, 
Brookings Institution ( June 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/ 
06/20-taiwan-un-winkler. 
48 East Asia Summit (EAS), Ass’n S.E. Asian Nations, http://www.asean.org/asean/ex- 
ternal-relations/east-asia-summit-eas (last visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
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 Finally, the last idea is that we want to encourage sharing. For ex-
ample, students may know about Zipcar.49 For those of you who don’t 
know, if you don’t have a car, Zipcar allows you to rent a car that you 
can park downtown at a specific place and you can book an hour or two 
of it. The next step is: I have a car, and it’s sitting in the parking garage 
for eight straight hours, and it’s not doing any good for me. You’re my 
colleague, and you need a car just for an hour or two, so you can go 
and do your groceries. Because I’m not making any money with it sit-
ting in the parking garage, if you pay me some relatively small 
amount—at least cover my parking, gas, wear and tear, and maybe a 
little other amount—then I profit, and you profit. That’s the sharing 
economy. That’s the mesh. 
 The other example, which is very actively growing, is Airbnb.50 
People in San Francisco have spare rooms. Their kids go to college and 
they have more bedrooms than they know what to do with—or, at least, 
one extra bedroom. People come to conferences in San Francisco, but 
the hotels are full and expensive. People would love to be able to pay 
for a room. Airbnb converts your house into a bed and breakfast. 
Airbnb is doing very well as a start-up.51 In fact, San Francisco has cre-
ated a sharing economy working group.52 In a world where sustainabil-
ity is the watchword, there will be more and more value created by 
bringing people together and allowing them to share what they have. 
 Now, translate that to states. Think about all the law and institu-
tions that encourage sharing best practices. We think of this as very 
weak stuff. The best example is the Copenhagen effort to get a global 
environmental treaty to fight global warming,53 which I would love to 
see. That’s one approach. It would be great if we could get it, but hav-
ing been in the State Department during that negotiation, I don’t see 
us getting there any time soon. 
                                                                                                                      
49 Zipcar, http://www.zipcar.com/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
50 Airbnb, https://www.airbnb.com/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
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 Another example is the C40.54 It is a group of forty big, global cit-
ies. It involves connecting those cities, meeting regularly, sharing best 
practices, committing to ongoing projects, and effectively saying, “I 
tried this and it worked. I tried this and it didn’t.”55 You share and you 
learn and you improve, in a continual model. That is law that actually 
encourages sharing. 
 A third example that is taking off is the Open Government Part-
nership.56 It started with eight countries in 2011, including the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, the Philippines, Indonesia, Mexico, 
South Africa, and Norway.57 There are now forty-five nations.58 What is 
it? It is a group of nations that come together and commit to transpar-
ency, civic participation, and accountability.59 
 You might think this looks like a division between democracies and 
non-democracies. There is a lot of that in there, but that’s not how it’s 
framed. It’s framed as open government, and open government is 
about transparency, civic participation, and accountability.60 These gov-
ernments pledge to make progress on specific areas. For example, 
whether you are a democracy or non-democracy, you may have to 
pledge to make your officials’ salaries public, to make your environ-
mental data public, or to make your health data public. And, you must 
do it in such a way that enables citizens to participate, and then share 
that experience with other nations. Again, this is a way of creating an 
institution that has a lot of power, if you think about power with. 
 Overall, I wanted to give you two different visions of power. First is 
the traditional vision of power in a hierarchy: power as command, pow-
er as controlling agendas, and power as shaping preferences. Contrast 
that with power with: power in a web, power in the center of a horizon-
tal world. Exercising this power is much more about bringing people 
together, connecting them, and mobilizing them. It is about opening 
things up so people are actually participating and you’re allowing them 
to define something together. It sounds touchy-feely, but it is increas-
                                                                                                                      
54 C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, http://www.c40cities.org/home (last vis-
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59 See id. 
60 See id. 
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ingly active. And if you don’t have coercive power, then you better have 
some other set of tools. 
III. Power, Law, and Lawyering in a Global Economy 
 So, what does this mean for lawyers? Let me end with how power 
and law interact in the global economy, or in any horizontal setting or 
network setting. What does this mean for how we think about being 
lawyers? I think it has some very interesting implications for how we 
think about what we do. 
 The first is that law—at least, popularly—is about resolving the 
things that push people apart. Let’s just think about the television ex-
amples of law. It’s litigation, it’s dispute, it’s courtrooms, it’s fighting. 
When I taught civil procedure, I would open my first class every year 
with a quote from Professor Stephen Yeazell. It’s a wonderful quote 
that says, “[Civil] procedure is the etiquette of ritualized battle.”61 And 
he is, of course, right. You used to do this with swords, with horses, and 
with lances. Now, we do it in the courtroom with briefcases. That’s good 
because people don’t die. Maybe of overwork, but it’s not bloody, gen-
erally. That is how we think about lawyers, in many ways. It’s about divi-
sion, conflict, resolving conflict. 
 This vision of law in the horizontal space is much more about how 
you bring people together. Now, some of that’s not new at all. Professor 
David Wilkins and many others have done work on law as problem solv-
ing.62 Problem solving, and, of course, dispute resolution, other than 
the straight adversarial model, is absolutely bringing people together. 
You’ve got a problem, let’s figure out how to solve it. 
 We teach a lot of those problem-solving skills. And that’s one of the 
differences traditionally between the Anglo-Saxon model of law and the 
civil model of law: that we focus much more on problem solving, which 
is a way of bringing people together.63 But, I think you can go much 
broader than that. 
                                                                                                                      
 
61 Stephen C. Yeazell, Civil Procedure 1 (7th ed. 2008). 
62 See, e.g., Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
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 One thing law does is to serve as a common metric. Why are law-
yers and economists often in positions of power? Among university 
presidents, for example, many are lawyers or economists.64 I suggest to 
you that this is because both law and economics are common metrics 
for putting lots of different things together. If you’re an economist, 
everything can be turned into costs and benefits. Everything. That’s 
what we teach in public policy school. No matter what it is, you can re-
duce it to costs and benefits. That’s good, because you can then weigh 
very disparate things. You can make policy choices that look very dispa-
rate because you’ve turned them into costs and benefits. 
 As lawyers, we turn everything into rights and obligations. That’s 
our common metric, our common currency. It’s almost like alchemy, 
where we take all these very disparate things, complicated cases, and we 
reduce them to: “You have these obligations and you have these rights, 
and how do those work?” 
 Think about that in a global horizontal context, and how important 
that is. We think about crossing national cultures all the time: language, 
culture, ethnicity, religion—all those differences. But, think about it as 
taking all these different problems, all these different cultures, all these 
different ways of approaching issues, and translating them into a com-
mon metric, into a common currency—the currency of rights and obli-
gations. 
 That is a way of thinking about what lawyers do that seems, to me, 
enormously important in a very diverse global world. You have a tool 
that allows you to take just about any problem and render it accessible 
by putting it into a common currency of rights and obligations. Differ-
ent cultures have different ways of talking about those rights and obli-
gations, but we all share that basic idea. We know that as lawyers. 
There’s no legal system in the world that doesn’t translate things into 
rights and obligations at some level, and I would say, even beyond that, 
into rights and obligations predicated on a system of values. The values 
can differ, but the values inform what you think people’s rights are, and 
what their obligations are. 
 Finally, in this horizontal world, we still have states as very impor-
tant actors. More broadly, I would say states’ governments including 
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local and state governments, provincial governments, regional gov-
ernments, national governments, and international government. In 
addition to states’ governments, however, the different sectors are also 
important actors. There is the corporate sector—all the different cor-
porate actors—and the civic sector—NGOs, foundations, churches, 
universities, think tanks. In this horizontal world—and this is some-
thing that both Secretary Clinton and President Obama talk a great 
deal about—you need the work of all three sectors. The Obama Na-
tional Security Strategy of 2010 references public-private partnerships 
nearly thirty times.65 I’ve read a lot of national security strategies, and I 
have to say, you could close your eyes and you’re not really sure what 
administration you’re reading because there’s an awful lot of “mother-
hood and apple pie,” and “national security and economic prosperity,” 
and “we’re all for everything that is good.” 
 “Public-private partnerships” is a new term. I assure you that to see 
the most powerful nation on earth write about its national security in 
terms of having to forge partnerships with the corporate and the civic 
sectors is different. It is because the problems we face are so big and so 
complex, there is no way to solve them simply by government. It 
doesn’t matter how much money the government has, it still must mo-
bilize what the corporate sector brings to it and what the NGO sector 
brings to it. 
 Think about environmental problems. Think about health prob-
lems. Think about food security or water security. Think about the 
global food initiative. You can’t do that without the big agricultural 
companies. There’s no way. You’re never going to get there. But, you 
can’t do it, either, without the NGOs that are going to monitor them, 
and the research institutes that are going to provide new technology, 
and the community organizations that are going to ensure things are 
implemented, and government because government has legitimacy and 
reach. So, in that world, lawyers have a tremendous ability to cross 
those cultures. 
 When I was teaching civil procedure, I would end the year by say-
ing, “We teach you to make arguments on different sides of every ques-
tion because we want you to be able to hear arguments on each side of 
every question. As law students, you don’t want to take those positions, 
and we’re making you be a hired gun and you don’t like that. You came 
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to law school because you want to champion a particular set of values. 
But, what we’re really doing is teaching you tolerance, and we’re teach-
ing you a kind of cross-cultural competence.” 
 To make arguments on any side of any question, you have to be 
able to put yourself in that other person’s shoes. You have to be able to 
really hear the argument on the other side, because only if you do that 
can you actually be persuasive, no matter whom you’re representing. 
Transpose those skills to a world in which you need all three sectors. 
Lawyers are exquisitely attuned to being culturally adaptable, to hear-
ing different sides of every question. 
 To bring the three sectors together, the first thing it takes is an un-
derstanding of the different cultures. You need to be able to walk up to 
a CEO and talk the language of costs and benefits. You need to be able 
to walk into an NGO and talk the language of values and purpose and 
effectiveness. And, you need to be able to walk into government and 
talk the language of policy and politics. Lawyers are very, very well edu-
cated to do those things. That is not how we typically think of our role. 
We do think of it as a problem-solver. But, we don’t think of ourselves as 
cross-cultural connectors. 
Conclusion 
 I want to leave you with the idea that in a global world, where hier-
archies are hard to establish—though they do exist: we have the United 
Nations system, the Security Council, the WTO, and a dispute resolu-
tion system that works—power operates horizontally more than verti-
cally. I’m not saying this is all horizontal, but it’s much more horizontal 
than national law. It involves mobilizing, convening, connecting, open-
ing yourself up to lots of different participation, sharing. To do all that 
work and make it produce outcomes requires a set of people who are 
very, very good at resolving disputes and solving problems, but also at 
bringing people together across very different cultures. So, I put to you 
that lawyers are ideally placed to exercise power in a transnational 
world, or a globalized world. Thank you very much. 
